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Banking Secrecy Lifted: The Swiss Act
to Counter Attacks Launched as a

Result of Their Bank's Actions During
World War II and Thereafter
I.

Introduction

When Edgar Bronfman, head of the World Jewish Congress,1
went with Israel Singer 2 to a meeting in Bern, Switzerland in
September 1995 to ask the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) 3 to
investigate dormant accounts of Holocaust victims, the bankers
proposed a settlement immediately.4 The bankers wanted to turn

1. The World Jewish Congress was set up in Geneva before World War II
(WWII) and is now based in New York. The organization has been "lobbying for
banks in many countries to search for funds of Holocaust victims, and to identify
and return assets looted by the Nazis from Jewish citizens." Stephanie Cook,
Digging Up the Past, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1996, at 48.
2. Israel Singer became interested in investigating Swiss behavior during
WWII after reading the novel The Swiss Account by Paul Erdman. Johanna
McGeary, Echoes of the Holocaust, TIME, Feb. 24, 1997, at 37, 38. Paul Erdman
was arrested and imprisoned for nine months for bank fraud in Switzerland over
twenty years ago. His novel sheds new light on Switzerland's role as financier for
Germany during the war, and describes secret deals among senior Swiss, German
and American officials. James R. Krauss, Banker-Turned-Writer Spins a Tale of
Intrigue, AM. BANKER, Oct. 20, 1992, at 2. Singer sought out the approval of
Edgar Bronfman, his boss, to begin an investigation. McGeary, supra.
3. The Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) is a voluntary association of
Switzerland's banks. The association has 405 bank members. Krauss, supra note
2, at 2.
The SBA plays two significant roles for Swiss banks-that of a traditional
trade association and that of a self-regulatory organization. In its
capacity as a trade association, the SBA advises its members on
significant legal and regulatory developments in Switzerland and abroad,
administers testing programs, and functions as the domestic and
international spokesperson for its members. In its capacity as a selfregulatory organization, the SBA cooperates closely with the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission and The Swiss National Bank in implementing specific policies and procedures for its members to follow.
U.S. Senate Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs Hearings (transcribed in
FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared testimony of
Hans J. Baer, Member of the Executive Board of the SBA).
4. McGeary, supra note 2, at 38. Neither Bronfnan nor Singer was offered
a place to sit during the meeting. There were literally no chairs for the two men.
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over $32 million5 discovered in 774 Jewish accounts since World
War II (WWII).

Increasing pressure has been placed on the Swiss over the past
few decades concerning their Bank Secrecy Laws and the effects of
those laws internationally. 6 According to Georg Krayer, a former
SBA president and author of Swiss Banking Secrecy, Swiss banking
secrecy has been reduced tremendously in recent years in an effort
to help fight international crime.7 The most recent attack against
the secrecy laws concerns the role of Swiss banks during WWII.
Swiss neutrality during WWII is now in question. Speculation and
concern about Swiss aid to the Nazis during WWII is increasing,
particularly with respect to alleged profits made by Swiss banks.
Such profits stem not only from German Jews who attempted to
safeguard their money in Switzerland, but also from money and war
spoils the Nazis confiscated from the central banks of other

countries.'
The secrecy of Swiss banks9 has been challenged in the past
by countries attempting to stop money laundering, to stop the

ability to hide funds obtained criminally, and to stop tax evasion.10
Many of the attempts to chisel away at the Swiss secrecy laws have
been successful to a certain degree, and have produced treaties or
similar documents." None of the attacks thus far, however, has
Id.
5. This meeting and lack of civility during the meeting on the part of the
Swiss made Bronfman more interested in investigating the matter rather than
settling it. Id.
6. Cook, supra note 1, at 48.
7. Carolyn Henson, Swiss Banks Unable to Shake Reputation Of Shady
Dealings, CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, May 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, Ailnews

Library.
8. Tom Bower, Tom Bower on a Shameful Conspiracy with Evil that Robbed
the Dead, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 11, 1996, at 20 [hereinafter Shameful Conspiracy].
9. See infra notes 19-80 and accompanying text.
10. The Great Swiss Bank Robbery, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at 6
[hereinafter Bank Robbery].
11. The issues of waning banking secrecy have been analyzed in various law

review articles. See, e.g., Paul Robert Eckert, Note, Utilizing the Doctrine of
Adverse Inferences When Foreign Illegality Prohibits Discovery: A Proposed
Alternative, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749 (1996) (obtaining evidence that is
located in a foreign jurisdiction where the law prohibits disclosure of such information); John V. Ivsan, Comment, Informational Liability and InternationalLaw: A
Post-Ratzlaf Comparative Analysis of the Effect of Treasury Reporting Requirements on International Funds Transfers, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263 (1994)

(evaluating money-laundering opportunities in bank secrecy countries and efforts
by the U.S. to curb such activity by enacting regulations); Gregory R. Raifnan,
Note, The Effect of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider
Trading, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565 (1983) (evaluating a Memorandum of
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been as politically and emotionally charged as the recovery of bank
accounts by survivors of the holocaust and by heirs of holocaust
victims. The Swiss have been forced to examine their past and to
take radical steps in order to vindicate themselves.
In Part II this Comment discusses the history and evolution of
bank secrecy laws in Switzerland,12 examines the Swiss laws that
protect the integrity of the financial institutions,13 and recognizes
the trend in Switzerland toward decreasing secrecy. 4 Part III
examines the bill passed in Switzerland and discusses the logistics
of its implementation as outlined by the Commission. 5 Part IV16
surveys the international influence on the actions of the Swiss.
Finally, the possible problems with lifting the secrecy laws and with
returning money to individual claimants or Jewish organizations are
addressed throughout this Comment. 7 The objective of this
analysis is to demonstrate that lifting secrecy laws may lead to
unanticipated problems, quite possibly curtailing the ability of Swiss
banks to compete in the banking industry. Furthermore, the
results people are looking for may be impossible to achieve. Even
though lifting the secrecy laws and investigating the accounts may
be the only practical alternative to solving the mystery of what
occurred and to satisfy the public in general, it still may not be
effective.
II.

History and Development of Banking Secrecy in Switzerland

The traditionally informal practice of banking secrecy in
Switzerland was codified in The Swiss Banking Law of 1934'9
(Swiss Bank Law). Prior to 1934, banks were expected to operate
within the legal framework designed to regulate various commercial

Understanding between the governments of the United States and Switzerland

designed to discourage the ability to utilize Swiss banking laws to perform insider
trading); 1977 Treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (1977)

(the countries agreed to cooperate to legally enforce activities deemed criminal in
both the U.S. and Switzerland).
12. See infra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
14.

See supra note 11.

15. See infra notes 85-126 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 127-65 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 115-126, 163-65 and accompanying text.
18. Peter Gumbel, Secret Legacies: Heirs of Nazis' Victims Challenge Swiss
Banks on Wartime Deposits, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 22, 1995.

19. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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and industrial activities, but no specific legislation was devoted to
banks.'
A. Possible Reasons for Codification of the Secrecy Practice
The motive for enacting banking secrecy laws is in dispute.
One theory that has been widely accepted is that the laws were
promulgated to protect German Jews who sought to hide their
assets prior to the Nazi invasion.21 A second theory contended
that it is simply a myth that the system of numbered bank accounts
emerged as a result of Nazi influence and the Swiss movement to
assist Jewish people.'
The Banking Law is believed to have been enacted by the
Swiss legislature to insulate the banking system and its customers
from attacks by Hitler.' The Nazis published regulations requiring all Germans to register their assets held outside of Germany,
and outlawed any transfer of funds outside of Germany from that
The humanitarian theory is doubted because
point forward. 2'
Swiss aid in the form of banking services to the Axis powers during
WWII was extensive, and went beyond the obligations under which
a neutral country must continue to trade with a belligerent nation
or force.' Furthermore, the Swiss made a pact with Germany to

20. NICHOLAS FAITH, SAFETY IN NUMBERS 40 (1982). The first draft of the
Banking Act was dated February 17, 1933, only 18 days after Hitler came into
power. Id. at 56. The first proposals to provide a framework for banking control
date back to 1916. Id. Absolute secrecy does not exist because banks are
obligated to furnish information when the higher interest of the public or the state
is involved, and usually under circumstances when the case involves a crime as
defined under Swiss law. C. Todd Jones, Comment, Compulsion Over Comity:
The United States'Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454
(1992).
21. FArrIH, supra note 20, at 35.
22. Id.
23. E. CHAMBOST, BANK AccouNTs 5 (1983).
24. Id.
25. FAITH, supra note 20, at 101. Switzerland was clearly driven by the profit
motive, rather than a motive to help German Jews. In early 1945, German
investments and accounts in Switzerland amounted to $600 million, real estate
holdings were $62 million, and insurance and annuities valued at $50 million. Id.
These investments did not include additional privately owned German accounts
that exceeded 500 million Swiss francs. Id German gold exports to Switzerland
were the lifeline of Germany's war effort abroad, and Switzerland furnished about
90% of Germany's foreign exchange requirements. Id. at 109-10. Furthermore,
Germans sold 1.6 billion Swiss francs worth of gold through Switzerland during the
war, which was ten times the official German pre-war gold reserves. Id. at 110.
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turn back Jews at their border.' One assessment of the secrecy
laws, as reported in a book review of Safety in Numbers by
Nicholas Faith, a British Journalist, is that the "Swiss later
reconstructed events to justify banking secrecy on humanitarian
grounds [which] is a testament to public relations skills that have
helped preserve secrecy against formidable investigative odds to
this day."27

Regardless of the reason for implementing the secrecy laws, it
is ironic that the very laws that attracted German Jews to utilize
the system have worked against them and their heirs. 8 Jews were
given assurances regarding the safety of their deposits, but when
heirs have attempted to claim funds, the banks have been unwilling
to assist them.29
B. The Swiss Banking Law of 1934°
Article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law3 sets forth the duty of
secrecy owed by a bank to its customers. The obligation is similar
that underlying the American attorney-client relationship.32 Any

26. Tom Bower, The Official Proofthat Swiss Banks Did Steal from the Jews,
DAILY MAIL, Dec. 19, 1996, at 32 [hereinafter Official Proof].
27. Robert J. Dowling, A Peek into the Vault of Swiss Banking Secrecy; Safety
in Numbers by Nicholas Faith, Bus. WK., Dec. 27, 1982, at 12.
28. Bank Robbery, supra note 10, at 6.
29. Id.
30. Article 47 of the Banking Law of 1934 states:
1. Whosoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as
officer, employee, authorized agent, liquidator or commissioner of a
bank, as representative of the Banking Commission, officer or employee
of a recognized auditing company, or who has become aware of such a
secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate
professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six
months or by a fine not exceeding 50,000 Swiss francs [approximately

U.S. $35,000].

2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a
fine not exceeding 30,000 Swiss francs [approximately
U.S. $21,000].
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after
termination of the official employment relationship or the exercise of the
profession.
C. Todd Jones, supra note 20, at 461 n.37 (citing Bundesgesetz uber die Banken
und Sparkassen of Nov. 8, 1934 (Banking Law of 1934), implemented in
Verordnung of May 17, 1972 (Ordinance), and Vollziehungsverordnung of Aug.
30, 1961 (Implementing Ordinance), reprintedin R. KINSMAN, YOUR NEW SWISS
BANK BOOK 10 n.2 (revised ed. 1979).
31. See Jones, supra note 20, at 461 n.37.
32. Ivsan, supra note 11, at 286.
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disclosure in violation of the secrecy law was deemed criminal.33
The Act allowed depositors to remain anonymous, and disclosure
of account information was prohibited.'
As a consequence of the Act, banks began to open accounts
identified only by numbers, often retaining no record of the
owner. 35 According to some reports, banks were also permitted
to destroy account information, however limited, after twenty
years. 3 6 Unfortunately, conflicting information exists regarding
this policy. One explanation for the policy is that after an account
remained dormant for ten years banks were required to post a
notice in the branch where the account was handled before
destroying the information.37 Then ten years after the notice was
posted, the bank was allowed to take possession of the unclaimed
39
funds. 38 This same process is apparently still in effect today.
Interpretation of the law in terms of keeping records is
disputed. A recent report stated that it was illegal under Swiss law
to shred documents on an account even if the owner has not been
heard from in decades.40 This report comports with that of one
Swiss government official who stated that contracts exist between
banks and their customers that are typically of unlimited duration.41 According to the official, the contractual status changes
only if another agreement exists or if the contract has been
canceled.42 So, under standard procedures, banks are obligated to
hold the deposited assets "in readiness to repay the customers or
their heirs."'43
Therefore, even after a substantial amount of time has passed,
rightful owners may attempt to claim the funds if they possess
satisfactory proof of their claim." However, the requisite proof

33. Jones, supra note 20, at 462.
34. Bank Robbery, supra note 10, at 6.
35. Neal Sandier, Switzerland's Moral Dilemma, Bus. WEEK, May 29, 1995,
at 80.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. In addition, if an account was legally closed by its owner, the bank
may wipe out deposit records only after waiting a period of ten years. Marcus
Kabel, Swiss Banks Reject Claims They Dumped War Files, REUTERS N. AM.
WIRE, Feb. 29, 1996 [hereinafter Dumped Files].
40. Dumped Files, supra note 39.
41. Gumbel, supra note 18.

42. Id.
43.
44.

Id.
Sandier, supra note 35, at 80.
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is reportedly a difficult level to achieve." Banks have demanded
death certificates and other documents that either never existed, or
were destroyed or lost because of the war.4 In many cases, the
account information was lost when the account holder perished in
a concentration camp.47 Other circumstances exist in which a
substantial amount of information is in fact known, but the Swiss
the cost
banks have been uncooperative nonetheless.4' Moreover,
49
of requesting a search is also prohibitive in some cases.

45. Id.
46. Rupert Cornwell, Swiss Banks Let Search Begin for Lost Jewish Cash,
INDEPENDENT, May 3, 1996, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Official Proof, supra note 26, at 32. The case of Ernestine Steinhard
epitomizes the reasons for distrust of the Swiss bankers. Steinhard was believed
to have been murdered during the Holocaust and her relatives, who escaped to
Israel, knew she had deposited money at the Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in
Zurich. Id The lawyer for the family, Hernusch Weigl, wrote to SBC asking for
information relating to the account. Id. The bank did not provide any help or
information, so the lawyer assumed the account had not been found. Id The
bankers asserted later, after Weigl pursued the matter, that Weigl had been unable
to satisfactorily prove that his clients were legally entitled to inherit Steinhard's
money. Id. Weigl filed a claim in accordance with the 1962 legislation passed to
investigate claims, but Hans Weber, who was in charge of the claims, was
unhelpful. Id. WeigI asked for assistance from Golda Meir, Israel's foreign
secretary at the time. Id. Steinhard's account did not fall within the terms of the
1962 legislation which dealt with dormant accounts; the account was not dormant
due to the letter of inquiry by Weigl. Id.
49. One paper reports that a 160 pounds fee has been routinely charged by
banks for account searches. Cornwell, supra note 46, at 10. Many applicants have
paid a search fee of approximately $70, only to receive a response that the bank
had checked back 10 years for which it was required to keep records, and found
no movement under the name. Id. If the account holder died in the holocaust,
it would make sense that there likely would have been no activity for much more
than 10 years. Id.
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C. Agreements and Legislation Used to Recover War Treasures
and Lost Bank Accounts
The Americans and the British began "Operation Safehaven""0 in an attempt to hinder Germany's financial transactions
by tracking down and freezing German assets worldwide. 1 The
Operation was a result of The Bretton Woods Agreement which
was passed at the International Money Conference in August
1944.52 The Swiss, however, refused to sign the agreement since
the language offended their position of neutrality. 3 Instead of
formally adopting the agreement, the Swiss did promise to
cooperate in facilitating the return of looted property to its rightful
owners.' While Operation Safehaven was under way, a settlement was reached in which the U.S. and Britain took $60 million
and the Swiss kept the rest of the estimated $400 million held in
Swiss banks.5 Other German assets held in Switzerland were
divided evenly between the Allies and the Swiss government.56
The promise of cooperation was recently reaffirmed by new
Swiss legislation that lifted banking secrecy laws in order to allow
a thorough investigation.57 Lifting banking secrecy laws for this
investigative purpose was suggested immediately after the war, but
was vehemently rejected by Max Oetterli, secretary of the SBA at
that time. 8
50. The Operation brought together three American departments, only
one of which, the Foreign Economic Administration, thought of it was a
central part of its raison d'etre... Safehaven developed from the talks
held early in 1944 between the American Treasury and the Swiss
Bankers' Association. The Americans "initially emphasized objectives
connected directly with the prosecution of the war," but as they
progressed, "tended to shift their direction and to concentrate on
preventing the Nazis from caching their spoils for post-war use."
FAITH, supra note 20, at 126.

51. The American and British governments warned neutral governments about
buying gold from the Germans and refused to recognize any such transactions at
the end of the war. Dr. L. von Castelmur, The Washington Agreement of 1946 and
Relations Between Switzerland and the Allies After the Second World War (visited
Mar. 5, 1997) <http://www.swissembassy.org.uk/news/castelmr.htm>.
52. FAITH, supra note 20, at 125.
53. Id. at 129.
54. Id.
55.

Daniel Jeffreys, Nazi Gold Trail Turns Fiction into Fact, INDEPENDENT,

Sept. 8, 1996, at 13. The amount was estimated by the Allies. IL
56. Id.
57. See infra note 74.
58. Gumbel, supra note 18. The Swiss Banker's Association adopted their
position during the war "which became standard over the next decades: that
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In accordance with the promise to cooperate, under the
Washington Agreement of 1946, s9 Switzerland paid the Allies 250
million Swiss francs in gold.6° The Swiss estimated that they held
250 million Swiss francs at the end of the war that was unaccounted
for as a result of the war. Two hundred fifty million Swiss francs
was also the amount the Swiss claimed for compensation for the
assets that their citizens lost to Germany.61 The terms of the
Washington Agreement were not completed until 1953 when the
Allies received 121.5 million Swiss francs and renounced their rights
to German assets in Switzerland.62
The Tripartite Commission was set up to disburse the gold
received by the Allies from these settlements.6 The money
remaining in the fund was supposed to be distributed early in 1997,
and the commission was scheduled to cease to operate.' The $68
million in the fund was recently frozen in place. 65 The money
may be used to start the fund to compensate Holocaust victims.'
Even after the settlement in 1953, questions still remained with
regard to lost accounts. As a result of political pressure, the Swiss
passed legislation in 1962 to establish a registration office inside the
Justice Ministry, giving people ten years to make claims. 67 Almost
all of the 7,000 claims made were rejected.' The process the
legislation prescribed was faulty.69 One reason many claims were
abolition of secrecy would lead to a wholesale withdrawal of funds by foreigners

and that any such withdrawal would prevent the banks' supporting the many bond
issues required to cover the government's unprecedented wartime deficits."
FAITH, supra note 20, at 137.

59. Signed in May 1946 following a year and a half of negotiations. FArrTH,
supra note 20, at 131.
60. Article 11.2 of the Washington Agreement stated,
[t]he Allied Governments declare on their part that, in accepting this
amount, they waive in their name and in the name of their banks of issue
all claims against the Government of Switzerland and the Swiss National
Bank in connection with gold acquired during the war from Germany by
Switzerland. All questions relative to such gold will thus be regulated.
Dr. L. von Castelmur, supra note 51.
61. FAITH, supra note 20, at 140.
62. Dr. L. von Castelmur, supra note 51.
63. David Sanger, Looted Gold Might Go to Holocaust Reparations; U.S.,
France and U.K Freeze $68 Million from Wartime Fund, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 5, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Reparations].
64. 1L
65. Id. It is believed to be money stolen from national reserves in central
banks, but its source is actually impossible to determine. Id.
66. Id.
67.

Gumbel, supra note 18.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.
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rejected was that the legislation excluded all individuals living in
then-communist Eastern Europe, regardless of the fact that these
individuals may have had valid claims.7' Furthermore, there was
no final report generated by the registration office, and there was
no type of regulation to ensure that banks reported all the possible
accounts involved.1 The difficulty with the investigation was
summed up by Rolf Block, president of Swiss Bank Corp., when he

said, "[y]ou'll never be able to prove 100% that there's nothing left.
It's like the Loch Ness Monster. You don't really
know if it exists,
72
and if so how big it is-but it keeps appearing.
In spite of Block's analogy, the Swiss have again yielded to
political pressures by altering their banking secrecy laws. A
Federal Decree of December 16, 1996, "Concerning the Historical
and Legal Investigation of the Fate of Assets Which Reached
Switzerland as a Result of Nationalist Socialist Rule," ("Decree" or
"Federal Decree") was passed by the Federal Council73 and the
Federal Assembly74 in Switzerland. The Decree lifted the banking
secrecy laws for purposes of investigating those assets which were
transferred to "banks, insurance companies, attorneys, notaries,
fiduciaries, asset managers or other physical or legal persons or
groups of persons

Bank.

7

1

. . .

or were received by the Swiss National

76
The Decree also established a commission of experts

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Gumbel, supra note 18.
73. The Federal Decree was passed December 13, 1996. Federal Decree of
December 13, 1996 Concerning the Historicaland Legal Investigation of the Fate
of Assets which Reached Switzerland as a Result of NationalSocialist Rule (visited
3/5/97) <http://www.swissembassy.org.uk/news/decree.htm>

[hereinafter Federal

Decree]. Federal Council is the upper house of parliament. Swiss Government
Backs Bill to Lift Nazi Assets Secrecy, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 16, 1996
[hereinafter Government Backs Bill].

74. The Federal Assembly is the lower house of parliament. The bill was
passed unanimously by the Assembly in September 1996. Government Backs Bill,
supra note 73.
75. FederalDecree, supra note 73, at Art. 1.1.
76. Article 2 of the Decree states:
Article 2 Execution of the Investigation
1. The Federal Council will appoint an independent commission of
experts charged with conducting the historical and legal investigation of
the extent and fate of assets under Article 1. Experts from various field
will form the commission.
2. The commission of experts will regularly inform the Federal Council
on the progress of their work, especially if, during the course of the
investigation, specific indications relating to claims covered by Article 1
emerge.
Id. at Art. 2.
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to investigate claims. In order to expedite the investigation, the
commission was granted
access to all records pertaining to the
77
accounts.
dormant
Article 5 distinguishes this legislative initiative from those
taken in the past to deal with this issue; this crucial element may
make feasible the task of determining how much money has been
held illegitimately by Swiss banks. The article, entitled "Obligation
to Grant Access to Records," reads as follows:
1. The persons and institutions mentioned in Article 1, their
legal successors as well as authorities and government offices
are obligated to grant access to all records pertaining to the
investigation to the members of the commission of experts
appointed by the Federal Council and researchers appointed by
them.
2. The obligation to grant access to the records takes precedence over any legal or contractual secrecy obligation.78
What records actually still exist, and whether banks will be
forthcoming with their compliance are both issues that remain
unanswered. Article 4 of the Decree proscribed the destruction of
existing records that could be useful during the investigation, 79 and
Article 9 set forth the punishments for violation of the Decree.'
There has been one widely publicized report regarding the
destruction of documents in violation of the recent Federal
Decree."1 A guard at Switzerland's biggest bank, Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS), gave to Swiss Jews documents that were going
to be shredded which he thought could help the investigation of
77. Id. at Art. 5.
78. Id. at Arts. 5.1 and 5.2.
79. Art. 4, entitled "Obligation to Preserve Records" reads: "Actions by
which existing records that could be useful to the investigation covered by Article
1 are destroyed, transferred abroad or otherwise made less accessible are
prohibited." Id at Art. 4.
80. Article 9, entitled "Criminal Provisions" states,
1. Whoever deliberately contravenes Article 4 or a decision made under
Article 5, Paragraph 1, will be punished by imprisonment or a fine of up
to 50,000 Swiss francs. If the contravention is negligent, the punishment
will be a fine of up to 10,000 Swiss francs.
2. The punishability for violations of official secrecy under Article 320
of the Criminal Code is reserved.
3. For infringements in business enterprises, Articles 6 and 7 of the
Federal Law on Administrative Criminal Matters are applicable.

4. Prosecution is the responsibility of the Cantons.
Federal Decree, supra note 73, at Art. 9.
81. Greg Calhoun, Suspicious Swiss Guard Gives Jews Bank Documents,
REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Jan. 14, 1997, at 12.
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lost Holocaust accounts." Officials of UBS acknowledged that
the plan to shred wartime-era documents was "a clear violation of
the government's ban on destroying material that could be
important in the search for dormant Jewish accounts. ' The bank
has also stated, however, that no client documents were included
so the documents were not relevant to the search for lost Jewish
money.84
The law prohibiting the destruction of banking documents,
however, does not limit the prohibition to client documents.' The
employee of UBS who ordered the shredding of bank documents
from the pre-WWII era is under investigation for an alleged
violation of the Final Decree of December 13, 1996, which
prohibited such destruction. 6 Mr. Christopher Meili, the guard
who thwarted the attempt to shred the pre-WWII documents, is
under investigation for violating Swiss bank laws which prohibit the
disclosure of recordsY
III. Recent Efforts Made to Uncover Jewish Assets
In addition to the legislation recently passed to lift banking
secrecy, the SBA started its own initiative in September 1995 by
opening a central contact office for those seeking to recover funds
that they believe were confiscated during the war.88 One commission was created by parliament to conduct investigations, and an
outside, independent commission has also been granted access to
files to research and conduct audits.

82. Id

83. Id.
84. Swiss Bank's Document Shredding Likely to Roil Issue of Jewish Assets,
CHIc. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1997, at 11.
85. See supra notes 79-80, and accompanying text.
86. Swiss Banks and Nazis: Hearing of the Banking and Financial Services
Committee (transcribed in FED. NEWS SERV., June 25, 1997) (prepared testimony
of Ambassador Borer).
87. It (prepared testimony of Mr. Christopher Meili). Mr. Meili was
employed as a guard during a rebuilding project at the UBS. Id. While on his
round at the bank, he noticed twelve push-carts full of very old documents in the

shredding room. lId After a cursory review of the documents, Mr. Meili
concluded that the documents originated in the time period from which no
documents were to be destroyed according to Swiss law. Id. He took the
documents from the bank and turned them over to the Zurich Jewish Community.
Id
88. Cook, supra note 1, at 49.
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A. Claims Process
The Federal Banking Commission agreed to a new claims
process in June 1997 which effectively superseded the process

implemented in January 1996 involving the Central Contact
Office.' The reports from continuous investigations have made
the complexity of the task clear. The original plan of a Central
Office will not be sufficient. Rather, a four-step process is now in
progress which replaced the first method for uncovering owners of
assets.
The Central Contact Office, which opened on January 1, 1996,
is run by the banking ombudsman in Zurich, Hanspeter Haeni.9
The banking ombudsman is an official elected by parliament.91
An ombudsman investigates reported complaints (as from students
or consumers), reports findings, and helps to achieve equitable
settlements. 92
The office was established in response to pressure from Jewish
groups to facilitate the investigation concerning specific claims of
Holocaust victims.93 Haeni received 1,650 inquiries in the last
year.94 In the process of conducting searches, however, money has
been traced to people who were neither Holocaust victims nor
related to people persecuted by the Nazis.95 Haeni also noted that

although there a search service fee is charged by the office, it has
been waived in more than 100 cases for potential claimants who
could not afford it. 96

The new process, on the other hand, is much more accessible
Names have been published of all dormant
to claimants.'
89. Hearing of the Banking and FinancialServices Committee, supra note 86
(testimony of Paul Volcker).
90. Cooke, supra note 1, at 51.
91. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrONARY 794 (1979) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].

92. Id.
93. Swiss Banks Receive 1,650 Inquiries Over Jewish Assets, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 24, 1997.

94. Id.
95. Id. "Haeni said in November that while 900 claims had been made and
assets worth a total of 1.6 million Swiss francs (1.25 million dollars) traced in 11
cases, only 10,000 dollars of the money turned out to belong to Holocaust victims."
Id
96. Id.
97. Simple claim forms are readily available, and contact points by means of
800 numbers and in many countries and cities, including, but not limited to, Israel,
New York and Switzerland, have been established. Hearing of the Banking and
FinancialServices Committee, supra note 86 (testimony of Paul Volcker).
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accounts in Swiss banks originating before 1945.98 Names will be
added to the list pursuant to the Volcker committee search.9
Claims through the ombudsman will be added to the data base, and
claims will be officially processed and sent to the appropriate
bank.'X°
B

Commission Elected by Parliament

The expert commission was created by the Federal Decree,
and has been elected by the government. 01 Its scope is the
widest of those groups investigating the role of Switzerland and
accounts lost during WWII." The elected commission has been
'
coined the name, "the truth commission. '""u
This commission
was created to study not only the role of Swiss during WWII, but
also its relations with other countries with respect to its banking
system and policies.' °4
C. The Volcker Commission
An agreement on May 2, 1996, between the World Jewish
Restitution Organization" and the SBA declared that an independent auditor should be allowed "unfettered access to all
relevant files in banking institutions regarding dormant accounts
and other assets and financial instruments deposited before, during
and immediately after the Second World War."'"
The sevenmember commission was officially named the "Independent
Committee of Eminent Persons," but has been referred to more
often as the "Volcker Commission. ' ' 1° Their tasks have included
98. See http://www.dormantaccounts.ch
99. Hearing of the Banking and FinancialServices Committee, supra note 86
(testimony of Paul Volcker).
100. Id The claims to named accounts will be turned over to the new "claims
reconciliation process." Id. An independent and objective international claims
resolution panel will decide, under liberal rules of evidence, if a claim is valid. Id
The Swiss Banking Commission and the Volcker committee will both maintain
supervision over the entire process.
101. FederalDecree, supra note 73, at Art. 2.1.
102. C-Span: House Banking Committee Hearing, December 14, 1996
[hereinafter C-Span] (testimony of Thomas Borer, Ambassador).

103. Id.
104. Id
105. The World Jewish Restitution Organization was set up by the World
Jewish Congress "to identify Jewish assets, confiscated by communist governments
after World War II,
and either return them to their rightful owners or donate them
to Jewish charities." Cook, supra note 1, at 48.
106. Id. at 49.
107. C-Span, supra note 94 (testimony of Volcker).
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retaining accounting firms, selecting a methodology for searching,
and seeing to it that banks cooperate by implementing the
process) °
The investigation of the Volcker Commission is limited to
dormant accounts."° The commission will not concentrate on any
specific claims, as inquiries in the past have been conducted."1
The first meeting was held on August 14, 1996,111 and the second
meeting was held on October 18, 1996.112 The commission has
planned a two-phase process, intended to be complete by June
1998.113
During the first phase of the process, which the commission
hopes to accomplish by the middle of 1997, historical data will be
gathered and analyzed, Swiss banking practice of the war era and
the present will be examined, and employee interviews will be
conducted with both present and retired employees who may be in
a position to have information regarding the treatment of dormant
accounts. 114 In addition, the commission will review past efforts
used to uncover dormant accounts, and contract for pilot audits of
four or five banks or banking offices representative of those which
may have received money of persecuted persons.115 The Swiss
affiliates of Arthur Andersen, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price
Waterhouse have been contracted to perform the audits.116 One
private bank, one cantonal117 bank, one regional bank, and two
of the three largest commercial banks will likely be auditoffices
118
ed.
The second phase of the investigation entails an audit of all
450 Swiss banks.119 To determine the firms that would audit the
banks, the committee considered the factors of expertise and
international experience in forensic accounting as well as familiarity
108. Hearings, supra note 3 (prepared testimony of Hans J. Baer).
109. Marilyn Henry, US SenatorBlasts Swiss for Delaying WWII Investigation,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17, 1996.
110. C-Span, supra note 102 (testimony of Volcker).

111. Id.
112.

Henry, supra note 109.

113.

C-Span, supra note 94 (testimony of Volcker).

114.

Id.

115. Id.
116. Tani Freedman, NetanyahuAgrees to Work with Swiss Over Looted Jewish
Assets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 31, 1997, available on LEXIS, Allnews

Library, at *3.
117. A canton is a state of the Swiss confederation. WEBSTER'S, supra note 91,
at 161.
118. C-Span, supra note 102 (testimony of Volcker).
119. Id.
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with Swiss banking law and practice.1" Three firms have been
selected and employed not only because of the extent of the work
involved, but also because of the need to avoid conflicts of
interest.1 21 The committee plans to avoid any accounting firms
investigating any institutions with whom they have an ongoing
business relationship."z
D. Difficulties with the Search
The auditing process will be difficult for a number of reasons.
Over fifty years have passed since the time the accounts originated.
Banking was different then, and over time individual banks have
merged, some banks have gone out of business, and accounting
systems have changed significantly."
Volcker suggested that
detailed information has been lost due to the shift to automation
in banking."2
In addition to the problems presented by elapsed time, the veil
of secrecy the accounts were established behind is a hindrance.
Many deposits were made by a third person, an agent, who may
have been a friend, lawyer, Swiss or non-Swiss."
The real
beneficiary was even hidden from the bank.1 26 A further complication arises from the fact that as the war became imminent, people
may have given their money to alleged agents who did not even
deposit the funds."V Even legitimate agents may not have kept
adequate records, or they may have diverted funds illegally because
they knew the beneficiaries were either untraceable or deceased. 128
In terms of tracing money, the role of other countries who
aided the Swiss indicate the extent of the complications involved
with tracing funds. Documents recently declassified and released
show that Switzerland further facilitated the Nazi wartime economy
by providing the means for Nazis to transfer money abroad.' 2

120.

Id.

121.

Id.

122. Id.
123.
124.
125.

C-Span, supra note 102 (testimony of Volcker).
Id.
IL

126. Id.
127. Id
128. C-Span, supra note 102 (testimony of Volcker).
129. Swiss Not Acting in Good Faith: New York Senator, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Jan. 14, 1997 [hereinafter Good Faith]. Sen. D'Amato's office publicized

the documents. Id
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Trade records for Portugal, for example, show that in 1940 less
than 2% of its exports went to Germany, but within two years the
figure reached 24.4%."3 In addition, the Swiss National Bank of
Bern sent 280 trucks to the Iberian Peninsula with tons of gold
deposited by the Nazis in Switzerland.'
Switzerland served as
the middleman after the Allies warned that transactions involving
the shipment of gold to Spain and Portugal would not be tolerated. 3 2 The amount of gold involved in trades and the origin of
the gold may be revealed via the lifting of the Swiss banking
secrecy laws. Even though banks in Portugal have agreed to study
the matter, the archives of the banks in Portugal are protected by
strict secrecy laws.133 Although a bank official in Portugal has
stated that all the gold may be attributed to legitimate trade,"
determining whether it in fact is, or is not, will be difficult.
IV. International Influence Forces Swiss to Act
The Swiss government undoubtedly lifted banking secrecy laws
as a result of international pressure. The countries that have been
involved in the investigations have been both interested in and, for
the most part, outraged by the information that has been gathered.
The reputation of Switzerland has indeed been damaged. Switzerland faces a long road ahead as it tries to untangle this complex
issue which has important legal and economic ramifications.
A. Senator D'Amato Leads the Crusade in the United States
Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Chair of the U.S. Senate
Banking Committee, held hearings in April and October of 1996 in
which testimony of the witnesses revealed the Swiss service to the
Reich.135 D'Amato has certainly been on the offense with respect
130. Marlise Simons, The Ghost of Nazi Gold Returns to Haunt Lisbon, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 11, 1997, at 1.
131. Good Faith, supra note 129.
132. Swiss Defend Wartime Gold Shipments to Iberia, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 10.
133. Simons, supra note 130, at 1.
134. Id.
135. McGeary, supra note 2, at 40. The witnesses included: Representative
Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), Chairman, House International Relations
Committee; Stuart Eizenstadt, Undersecretary of Commerce for International
Trade; Edgar Bronfman, President, World Jewish Congress, and Chairman, World
Jewish Restitution Organization; Avrahan Burg, Chairman, Jewish Agency for
Israel; Greta Beer, Claimant to Funds; and Hans Baer, Chairman, Julius Baer
Bank and Baer Holding, Ltd., and Member, Swiss Bankers Association Executive
Board. Hearings,supra note 3.
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to investigating the issue of lost bank accounts. He has been
especially critical of the fact that the Volcker commission"36 may
take up to five years to publish a report." 7 The Federal Decree
has been enacted for a period of five years in order to allow
enough time for the investigations.138 Government officials stated
that they expect the report to be out within about three years.'3 9
In addition, in defense to the attack regarding the amount of time
the investigation may take, Thomas Borer, ambassador, stated,
"[the] Swiss behave like watch-makers. If we have a problem, We
think about it, we try to do serious and thorough work. We will
make a wonderful watch to show the world in two to three years.
But people want it in two to three months."'" The pressure is
mounting from within Switzerland as well as from abroad."" As
a result of the tension, Paul Jolles, a retired diplomat who served
on the delegation to negotiate the 1946 Washington Accord142
voiced concern over a possible breakdown between U.S. and Swiss
relations.'43
There are good reasons to be concerned about relations
between the U.S. and Switzerland. The Swiss have been forced to
act by Americans, but even when the Swiss government cooperates,
they continue to be berated as a result of recently declassified
information about their past. Stuart Eizenstadt, Chairman of the
Clinton Administration Probe into Nazi Assets, pointed out that it
is not appropriate to judge the Swiss today based on the activities
of their predecessors.'TM On the other hand, he added that it is
reasonable to hold the Swiss accountable for how they handle the
issues as information is revealed. 45
The threat by Americans to boycott Swiss banks certainly
strained relations. The boycott would have affected 196 foreign

136. See supra note 97-114 and accompanying text.
137. CNN Early Edition (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 29, 1997) (interview
with Sen. D'Amato (R-NY))[hereinafter D'Amato Interview].
138. See Federal Decree, supra note 73.
139. C-Span, supra note 102.
140. Roy Gutman, Swiss Accounts Unraveling the Secrets, NEWSDAY, Feb. 25,
1997, at A08.
141.

Id.

142. See supra note 59-60 and accompanying text.
143. Gutman, supra note 140, at A08.
144.

Thomas Friedman, Swiss Must Face Up to What They Did Duringthe War,

TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 7, 1997, at B07.
145. Id.
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banks, eight of which are Swiss."4 TWo proposed laws dealt with
the possible boycott. 147 One law suggested withdrawing New
York City funds from Swiss banks until the compensation fund was
formed.' The second proposed law would force Switzerland and
other non-American New York City banks to "quit the city" if they
refuse to comply with requests of auditors and if they are suspected
of holding assets of Holocaust victims. 49 Although the Swiss
originally rejected the idea of setting up an interim fund to help
Holocaust survivors, in the face of threats such as the boycott, they
demands." ° The banks agreed to set up
have acquiesced to such
15
'
a fund of $70 million.
The future
The threats have clearly produced results.
productivity of the antagonistic relationship will be a concern.
Eizenstadt noted that a boycott of Swiss banking would be counterproductive because damage to the Swiss banking system would be
detrimental to the world economy.15 2 Perhaps an actual boycott
would hurt the U.S. economy, but the mere threat may have been
productive, since the Swiss responded. International relations,
however, will certainly be strained.
Other action in New York with respect to the Swiss banks has
included a class action lawsuit which was filed in October 1996 to
seek recovery of lost account funds.5 3 The suit seeks up to $7
billion."
This suit will likely be adjudicated after the investigations and audits are complete. It would not be surprising, however,
if agreements between the countries would bargain away the right
to such claims.

146. Switzerland Tries to Cool Tempers Over Holocaust Gold, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 31, 1997.
147. Id.
148. Id This proposal would affect $225 million deposited with a subsidiary of
the Credit Suisse Group, C.S. First Boston, Inc. Id
149. Id.
150. Gutman, supra note 140, at A08.
151. Id.
152. Marcus Kabel, Swiss Banks Say They are Rushing on Holocaust Fund,
REUTERS AM. WIRE, Jan. 30, 1997 [hereinafter Fund].
153. James Gillaspy, Five Decades after the Holocaust, Survivors and Victims'
Familiesare Fightingto Regain the Wealth Taken by Nazis and Secured in Secretive
Swiss Banks. In an Effort to Settle Accounts, They're Battling to Reclaim
their... STOLEN FORTUNES, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 23, 1997, at A01.
154. Id.
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B. Secret Agreements
According to a 1950 statement from the then-foreign minister
of Switzerland, the country struck a post-war deal with Poland, 5'
in that "heirless property of Polish citizens in Switzerland was to be
deposited in a Swiss bank account for the Polish National Bank and
that the Polish government had agreed to take over the obligations
it owed Swiss citizens, banks and life insurance companies."' 5 6
The agreement broke the laws of Poland, and Poland has been
trying to analyze the situation to come up with a way to resolve the
7
problem.1
According to reports out of Poland, the agreement between
Poland and Switzerland was legally flawed. The agreement was not
ratified by the Polish parliament, and the way the money was
accepted was unlawful because inheritance proceedings were not
conducted.158 The money was used to compensate "Swiss nationals whose assets had been seized in communist Poland."' 5 9
Revealing the names of the account holders affected by the
Polish agreement falls within the exception to the banking secrecy
laws in the Federal Decree. Both countries admit that the secret
deal was wrong, but who should compensate whom and how much
poses an interesting dilemma. Swiss citizens who received money
as a result of the deal have a bona fide claim to the funds they
received. It would, of course, be close to impossible to trace the
money and even if it could be done, the people who received the
money did so in good faith from their government. Whether
Switzerland should pay those citizens what it would have owed
presents a problematic legal issue. They struck a deal with Poland,
and probably benefitted from it, so it may be proper to demand
that the Swiss pay each claimant. On the other hand, the deal was
more complicated and involved more than just lost accounts.
Poland made the deal because they had seized Swiss assets. It is
possible that one side benefitted more than the other; however, if
one assumes an arm's length transaction, it would seem that each

155. Arthur Spiegelman, Jewish Group Demands Restitution from Swiss,
REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Oct. 18, 1996.

156. Id.
157. Switzerland to Reveal Names of DeceasedAccount Holders, POLISH NEWS
BULL., Jan. 16, 1997.
158. Poland to Try to Put Right 1949 Swiss Bank Deal, REUTERS N. AM.
WIRE, Jan. 7, 1997.
159. Id.

1997]

BANKING SECRECY LIFTED

side received something of comparable value. In that case, Poland
may have the duty to "reimburse" the heirs of its citizens whose
property rights the Polish government bargained away. It would
seem logical to hold Switzerland accountable for the difference
between the amount of money the Polish citizens lost, and the
amount it still owes them. It may also make sense to hold Poland
accountable for the balance due to its own citizens based on its
participation in the deal. Further investigations may make this
particular matter more clear.
C. Reasons for Swiss Action are Important
The fact that Switzerland has taken action (e.g., by enacting
the Federal Decree and setting up the interim fund), only in
response to international pressure has not helped the country's
reputation. One might argue that as long as action has been taken
and progress is made, the motive behind the action is irrelevant.
On the other hand, the motive behind the action may be important
in terms of trustworthiness. True cooperation and a forthright
attitude have been displayed on one front, '60 but at the same
time, a number of incidents have exposed another attitude among
the Swiss.
Conflicting messages have been reported not only from among
Swiss government officials, but also from some officials who have
contradicted themselves. Carlo Jagmetti, former Ambassador for
Switzerland to the United States, made a statement that Switzerland was considering setting up a compensation fund 161 (before
Switzerland announced that it had decided to set up such a fund).
Jagmetti also wrote in a confidential memo that was revealed by an
unknown source, that the Swiss government should "wage war"
against "charges that Swiss banks failed to account for missing
funds of World War II Holocaust victims." 62 Jagmetti resigned
as ambassador following the publication of the memo.1 63 In an
interview on January 31, 1997, Jagmetti spoke in support of a legal
approach to the issues which would include a series of formal

160. C-Span, supra note 102.
161. David Sanger, Swiss Role as the Nazis' Banker Jolts an Embassy to Life,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 1997, at 5.
162. National Press Club Morning Newsmaker (transcribed in FED. NEWS
SERV., Jan. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Jagmetti Interview] (interview with Carlo
Jagmetti following his resignation).
163. Id
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The first report by the Volcker commission,"
agreements."
then subsequent conferences in 1998 (the International Conference)
and the conference planned in Geneva would all serve as a basis to
An international law approach will be
establish the facts."
essential due to the fact that many governments were and have
been involved.167
The Economics Minister Jean-Pascal Delamuraz'6 was asked
to resign by the socialist party because of his assessment of requests
to set up the interim recovery fund. 69 He was quoted as saying
that the demands amounted to "blackmail," and furthermore that
setting up the fund would be an admission of guilt. 70
The incident involving the shredding of documents in violation
of the Federal Decree combined with the resignation of two Swiss
officials have provided reasons to doubt the extent to which the
Swiss are really willing to cooperate. They took a big step when
they lifted the secrecy laws, but it seems dubious that the Decree
will be enough; it merely provides the legal means to allow
investigations. Cooperation by the Swiss will be essential for the
process to be successful.
D. Was Lifting the Secrecy Laws an Appropriate Measure?
Since only 26 of 500 banks responded to the governmentmandated sweep of accounts in 1962,171 and recently released
documents have further implicated the Swiss in improper behavior,
lifting secrecy laws seems appropriate. The outside research and
audits will add an element of legitimacy to the process that was
missing in the past.
To protect clients of Swiss banks, the accounting firms are
required to adhere to "banking secrecy laws on the diffusion of
Clients may
information concerning the identity of clients."''
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 118-128.
166. Jagmetti Interview, supra note 162.
167. Id.
168. There are seven ministers in the Swiss federal government: five from the
political right and two socialists. They have a rotating presidency held by one

minister, and Delamuraz held it until the end of 1996. Serge Romensky, Political
Crisis Looms Over Swiss Involvement in Nazi gold, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan.
26, 1997.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Peter Nielsen, Swiss Banks May have More Holocaust Money, REUTERS
N. AM. WIRE, Jan. 31, 1997. See also, supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
172. Freedman, supra note 116.
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have reason to be concerned about the adherence to the secrecy
laws, again based upon recent events including the violation of the
Federal Decree with the incident of destruction of wartime
documents, and the publication of the confidential memo, which
also carries with it legal penalties.'"
V.

Conclusion

The Swiss now face a moral dilemma. They cannot move
toward a solution without criticism from the outside. There is
every indication that it will be impossible to trace specific accounts
to heirs in order to return money to individuals. That does not
mean that the best effort should not be made. Indeed, the Swiss
have done so by lifting their banking secrecy laws for that purpose.174 When money is unaccounted for, and the claimants
cannot be identified, two possibilities exist-either the money could
have belonged to a Holocaust victim or not. Therefore,, whether
the money should be transferred to a relief fund set up to benefit
Holocaust survivors will come into question.
As a matter of moral obligation, the Swiss should make every
attempt to mitigate the impact they had on the hardship of
Holocaust victims. Since the Swiss have taken action to investigate,
and to facilitate the investigations by outsiders, it seems unfair to
ask for additional sacrifice. It does not seem reasonable to expect
answers or results immediately, regardless of the unfortunate
circumstances of particularly aged victims. It is easy to sympathize
with the victims and lay the responsibility on the Swiss government,
but this is a complicated matter. It cannot be, and should not be
expected to be, solved in a short period of time.
Outside forces ought to be pleased that the'Swiss have finally
lifted their banking secrecy laws. Furthermore, the Swiss government should be given credit for passing the Decree through
parliament within six months from the time it was proposed. Swiss
behavior during WWII may remain under fire, but the action taken
seems appropriate under the circumstances. The emotional outrage
among people is certainly understandable, but substantial progress
is at long last being made toward a resolution.
Kathryn H. Lamont

173. Jagmetti Interview, supra note 162.
174. See FederalDecree, supra note 73.

